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ADDITIONALITY: THE NEXT STEP FOR 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS 
KAREN BENNETT* 
INTRODUCTION 
Natural landscapes, and the benefits they provide humans, have 
always been freely available—but their existence is now under 
constant threat.  In an attempt to secure the continued provision of 
nature’s benefits, the past decade has seen a rise in new markets and 
payments for ecosystem services (“PES”),1 such as wetland mitigation 
banking, water quality markets, and payments for carbon 
sequestration from soil and forests.  In its most basic form, a PES is 
where people who benefit from ecosystem services pay the 
landholders who provide those services.  In return for payment, 
landholders alter their land management practices in ways that 
restore and preserve natural landscapes.2  This paper utilizes the 
terms “payment for ecosystem services” and markets for ecosystem 
services in their broadest sense, encompassing what others have 
termed PES, such as the Costa Rica program,3 ecosystem service 
markets, such as the international market for carbon offsets,4 
mitigation banking, such as the wetlands program established in the 
 
 * Karen Bennett is a second year student at Duke University School of Law.  Prior to 
entering law school, she worked as a research program coordinator in the ecosystem services 
program at the World Resources Institute.  Karen would like to thank Nicholas Bianco, Derik 
Broekhoff, Lydia Olander, and Jim Salzman for their comments and support in developing this 
paper. 
 1. SVEN WUNDER, PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: SOME NUTS AND 
BOLTS, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 42, at 3 (2005).  According to Wunder, a payment for 
ecosystem service is: (a) a voluntary deal (b) for a specific ecosystem service (or land use 
determined to produce that service) between (c) at least one purchaser and (d) at least one 
producer where (e) the producer actually secures the service. 
 2. E.g., Sven Wunder, The Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical 
Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48, 50 (2007). 
 3. Stefano Pagiola, Payments for Environmental Services in Costa Rica, 65 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 712, 712 (2008). 
 4. E.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Marrakesh Oct. 29–Nov. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002). 
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United States,5 and conservation programs, such as the Conservation 
Reserve Program.6,7 
The PES approach to conservation and resource management is 
quickly growing and can now be found at all governing levels across 
the globe.8  The myriad PES programs in existence vary in scope and 
substance.  Most of these systems have grown organically, learning 
from the experience of others in the field.  Many organizations have 
developed guides to help people creating ecosystem service markets 
learn from others’ experience.9 
Simultaneously, localities, states, nations, and regions around the 
globe have begun to implement systems to combat climate change.  In 
so doing, many authorities have created market-based programs to 
encourage emissions reductions.  Many of these programs provide 
entities required to reduce emissions the option of meeting their 
targets by buying or funding reductions made by others through 
technological development and land management changes.10  The 
resulting “carbon markets” bear many similarities to ecosystem 
service markets.  Some carbon markets, such as the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) program, which allows 
crediting of afforestation projects, are in fact ecosystem service 
markets.  Yet many features considered crucial in the carbon market 
do not always find acceptance in markets for other ecosystem 
 
 5. E.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Mitigation Banking Factsheet, http://www.epa.gov/ 
wetlands/facts/fact16.html (last visited June 8, 2010). 
 6. U.S. Dept. of Agric. Farm Serv. Agency, Conservation Reserve Program, http:// 
www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=copr&topic=crp (last visited June 8, 2010) 
[hereinafter USDA FSA]. 
 7. G. Arturo Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., Costa Rica’s Payment for Environmental Services 
Program: Intention, Implementation, and Impact, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1165, 1166 
(2007). 
 8. See, e.g., Steven Zwick, Ecosystem Markets Finish Year on (Relatively) High Note, 
ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, Dec. 31, 2008, http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/ 
dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=6414&section=news_articles&eod=1. 
 9. See, e.g., KAREN BENNETT & NORBERT HENNINGER, PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES IN COSTA RICA AND FOREST LAW NO. 7575: KEY LESSONS FOR LEGISLATORS 
(2008), available at http://www.e-parl.net/eparlimages/general/pdf/090422%20e-
Parliament%20Forests%20Initiative.pdf; KATOOMBA GROUP, FOREST TRENDS & UNEP, 
PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED: A PRIMER (2008) available at 
http://www.forest-trends.org/publication_details.php?publicationID=2347; TO N. NGUYEN ET 
AL., A GUIDE TO MARKET-BASED APPROACHES TO WATER QUALITY (2006); JANET 
RANGANATHAN ET AL., ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: A GUIDE FOR DECISION MAKERS (2008), 
available at http://www.wri.org/publication/ecosystem-services-a-guide-for-decision-makers. 
 10. E.g., UNFCCC, supra note 4; see also REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE [RGGI], 
MODEL RULE § 10 (2008), available at http://www.rggi.org/about/history/model_rule. 
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services.  For carbon markets and PES programs to maximize 
environmental benefits and fiscal efficiency, each should draw lessons 
from the other type of market. 
This paper looks at one element, additionality, which is a 
fundamental component of most climate change markets,11 and 
considers its application to ecosystem service markets.  Under a PES 
program, when someone pays a landholder to implement a certain 
management practice, technology, or conservation system to secure 
an ecosystem service, that activity is deemed “additional” if it would 
not have happened in absence of the payment provided by the PES 
system.12  Additionality is a critical component of any environmental 
market and should be used with more frequency across the spectrum 
of PES systems.  Additionality, however, is often seen as expensive, 
onerous, and an impediment to quick uptake of new PES systems.13  
This paper reviews common policy approaches to analyzing 
additionality in an attempt to overcome this criticism and present 
additionality as a pragmatic, as well as environmentally sound, 
component of ecosystem service markets. 
The analysis is based on the assumption that payments for 
ecosystem services are made in order to achieve specific 
environmental outcomes.  Some PES arrangements do not have this 
goal and, instead, are subsidy programs, offering payment for the 
provision of ecosystem services that would have occurred even in the 
absence of payment.  For example, Costa Rica’s system, which pays 
landholders who conserve forests, use sound forest management, or 
plant new forest, tries to “recognize” what ecosystem services forest 
holders are providing, regardless of whether or not that provision is 
new or dependent on the payment.14  Systems with goals like Costa 
Rica’s do not necessarily fit under the analysis here, which is based on 
creating the most efficient system possible to reach a target 
environmental outcome. 
 
 11. Matthew M. Sommerville, Julia P.G. Jones & E. J. Milner-Gulland, A Revised 
Conceptual Framework for Payments for Environmental Services. 14 ECOLOGY & SOCIETY 34, 
40 (2009), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art34/. 
 12. See, e.g., Stefanie Engel, Stefano Pagiola & Sven Wunder, Designing Payments for 
Environmental Services in Theory and Practice: An Overview of the Issues, 65 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 663, 670 (2008). 
 13. Sommerville et al., supra note 11, at 40. 
 14. Pagiola, supra note 3, at 718. 
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I. WHAT IS ADDITIONALITY? 
The fundamental question to determine additionality is: What 
would have happened without a market incentive? To be additional, 
pollutant reductions or land-use changes must be made or avoided in 
direct response to payment. 
Take, for example, a farmer in North Carolina offering to plant a 
riparian buffer along a river that runs next to his property.  That 
buffer would prevent excess fertilizer from running into the river, 
thereby reducing the nutrient load in the waterway.  This project 
would likely be eligible for payment in an ecosystem service market 
attempting to lower eutrophication in a water body connected to the 
farmer’s river—but is it additional? In order to find out, the potential 
buyer or organization managing the market would have to determine 
whether the farmer would have planted the riparian buffer regardless 
of receiving funds from a water quality market (in which case his 
project is not additional) or whether the market was really the 
impetus for his changed behavior (in which case it would be 
additional).  If the farmer would not have planted the buffer but for 
the water quality payment, then nutrient reductions from his farm 
would be considered additional. 
Most PES programs do not require that projects be additional in 
order to participate.  A 2006 survey of payments made for 
conservation found that no programs at the time were directly 
assessing additionality for program participation.15  A 2008 study cited 
only one program, the CDM, which accounted for additionality in its 
upfront analysis of projects.16  Some PES markets, which are 
highlighted later in this paper, are incorporating additionality criteria 
into their operations, but it is often in the form of ex ante analysis17 or 
secondary inclusion in pursuit of another policy goal.18  Most carbon 
markets, on the other hand, explicitly identify additionality as 
 
 15. Paul J. Ferraro & Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Money for Nothing? A Call for Empirical 
Evaluation of Biodiversity Conservation Investments, 4 PLOS BIOLOGY 482, 483 (2006). 
 16. Sven Wunder, Stefanie Engel & Stefano Pagiola, Taking Stock: A Comparative 
Analysis of Payments for Environmental Services Programs in Developed and Developing 
Countries, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 834, 845 (2008). 
 17. For example, there have been several studies retroactively assessing the additionality of 
the United States’ Conservation Reserve Program. See, e.g., 
Ruben N. Lubowski, Andrew J. Plantinga & Robert N. Stavins, Determinants of Land-Use 
Change in the United States, 1982-1997, (RFF Discussion Paper No. 03-47, 2003); PATRICK 
SULLIVAN, ET AL., THE CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RURAL AMERICA 48 (2004). 
 18. Wunder et al., supra note 16, at 845. 
Bennett_Final.doc 7/15/2010  6:19:29 PM 
Summer 2010] ADDITIONALITY: THE NEXT STEP 421 
fundamentally important to the program, though it is not always a 
requirement for participation in practice.19 
II. WHY DOES ADDITIONALITY MATTER? 
Implementing a PES program without questioning what would 
have happened in its absence is to proceed “with an unwavering faith 
in the connection between interventions and outcomes and without a 
plan to judge the effectiveness of such interventions.”20  Assessing 
additionality is necessary for a PES scheme to achieve its 
environmental target with economic efficiency while maintaining 
investor confidence. 
A. Achieving an Environmental Outcome 
Environmental markets come in several forms.  Under some 
models, an entity trying to achieve a particular environmental 
outcome pays another to preserve or enhance the environment.  For 
example, in the 1990s, New York City needed to improve its water 
quality to meet potable water quality regulations imposed by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).  The City 
acquired land and negotiated contracts governing landowner activity 
on other lands in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds to improve 
the quality of the water reaching Manhattan.21 
In other systems, regulation has put an overall limit on pollution, 
but pollutant output by one actor is allowed to be “offset” by 
pollutant reductions from another actor.22  For example, starting this 
year, Pennsylvania will “cap” nitrogen and phosphorous discharges 
from industrial facilities to protect water quality in the Chesapeake 
Bay.23  Industries can meet their environmental obligations under the 
regulation via reductions made offsite, by purchasing credits from 
other capped entities that have over-complied, or from uncapped 
regional farmers implementing practices that reduce nutrient runoff 
 
 19. DERIK BROEKHOFF, EXPANDING GLOBAL EMISSIONS TRADING: PROSPECTS FOR 
STANDARDIZED CARBON OFFSET CREDITING 2 (2007), available at http://www.ieta.org/ 
ieta/www/pages/getfile.php?docID=2730. 
 20. Ferraro & Pattanayak, supra note 15, at 484. 
 21. SEAN MURPHY, J. WOLFE TONE & PAUL SCHWARTZBERG, LAND ACQUISITION FOR 
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION: NEW YORK CITY AND THE CATSKILLS WATERSHED SYSTEM 
60 (1995), available at http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/updates/pdf/V100_A9.pdf. 
 22. See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 4; RGGI, supra note 10, at 59; MINDY SELMAN, ET AL., 
WATER QUALITY TRADING PROGRAMS: AN INTERNATIONAL OVERVIEW (2009). 
 23. SELMAN et al., supra note 22, at 6. 
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from cropland, such as no-till agriculture.24  Supported by a similar 
philosophy, there are also mitigation banks, which conserve or restore 
land in one location to “offset” land conversion elsewhere.  This 
approach is used for wetlands, for example, to maintain the no net 
wetland loss policy of the United States government.25  Finally, there 
are conservation payments, where one group pays another to use 
conservation techniques, such as the United States’ Conservation 
Reserve Program.26 
Despite their difference in form, under all of these programs one 
group is paying to secure an ecosystem service in order to pursue a 
concrete environmental goal.  This general philosophy underlies the 
importance of additionality for all of these systems.  If a program pays 
a landholder to secure an environmental benefit, it counts that 
reduction toward the overall environmental goal.27  If the payment 
does not pay for a new ecosystem service, then the program is 
counting something without gains actually being achieved.  In a PES 
program with a regulatory limit, such as the example from 
Pennsylvania, whether or not an industry purchases offsets should not 
alter the total level of reduction reached.  In a system that guarantees 
additionality, the reductions are simply being achieved in a different 
place or a different way.  Without additionality, the environmental 
goals of the project may not be met. 
Take the example of the sequestration of carbon dioxide by a 
forest.  Through the CDM, a capped entity within a country with a 
mandatory greenhouse gas emission reduction can partially reach that 
target by funding an afforestation project in a developing country.28  
The fundamental idea underlying this program is that by enabling 
additional sequestration of carbon dioxide in trees, the emissions of 
the funding country will be offset by sequestration elsewhere.  If, 
however, the afforestation project would have happened regardless of 
the payment provided through the CDM, then no new benefit is 
obtained through the payment, and the emissions in the funding 
country are not offset, leading to a higher concentration of 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 5. 
 26. USDA FSA, supra note 6. 
 27. E.g., OFFSET QUALITY INITIATIVE, ENSURING OFFSET QUALITY: INTEGRATING HIGH 
QUALITY GREENHOUSE GAS OFFSETS INTO NORTH AMERICAN CAP-AND-TRADE POLICY 1 
(2008), available at http://www.offsetqualityinitiative.org/briefings.html; WRI, OVERVIEW OF 
REGIONAL INITIATIVE’S OFFSET PROGRAM (2009), available at http://pdf.wri.org/ 
regional_cap_and_trade_programs_offsets.pdf. 
 28. UNFCCC, supra note 4, at 22. 
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greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  This failure to uphold the 
principles of additionality would then lead to Kyoto reduction targets 
not being met in terms of actual emissions avoided. 
B. Economic Efficiency 
Another principle underlying the critical importance of 
additionality is one of economic efficiency.  If someone pays for an 
activity which would have happened regardless of the payment, most 
would consider this to be a waste of money.  In the Costa Rica 
system, for example, forestholders receive payments to conserve 
forestland, plant new forest plantations, or better manage forests.29  
Studies have found that many recipients of program funding would 
have protected or created their forests regardless of the program.30  
Given there is significantly more demand to participate in the 
program than can be accommodated,31 greater environmental benefits 
could be achieved through the program by adding additionality 
criteria to the program’s requirements.  If funding was targeted at 
those who would not conserve or plant forests but for the PES 
program, then additional forestland could be preserved and created 
through payments.  Those who would have conserved without the 
payment would still protect their forests. 
As stated in the introduction, however, Costa Rica’s system 
explicitly announces that it is paying for environmental services 
already being provided, as well as those provided additionally in the 
future.32  For Costa Rica, PES promotes equity; those with forestland 
are providing a benefit to society, the ecosystem services on their 
land.  Those who benefit from the services should pay, as they do for 
most services in most sectors of a free market economy.  Other PES 
programs pursue separate goals outside of environmental benefits, 
such as poverty reduction.33  In programs where the main purpose is 
 
 29. Bennett & Henninger, supra note 9, at 1. 
 30. Pagiola, supra note 3, at 718. 
 31. Only a quarter of demand is presently met with current funding.  KATIA KAROUSAKIS, 
INCENTIVES TO REDUCE GHG EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
COSTA RICA AND MEXICO, 21 (2007), available at http://unfccc.int/files/methods_science/ 
redd/application/pdf/incentives_to_reduce_ghg_emissions_from_deforestation_lesson_learned_f
rom_costa_rica_and_mexico.pdf. 
 32. Pagiola, supra note 3, at 718. 
 33. See, e.g., J.K. Turpie, C. Marais & J.N. Blignaut, The Working for Water Programme: 
Evolution of a Payments for Ecosystem Services Mechanism that Addresses Both Poverty and 
Ecosystem Service Delivery in South Africa, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 788, 791 (2008); Sven 
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to reach a particular environmental outcome or promote as much 
conservation as possible, however, payments to those already 
protecting or restoring land are inefficient and do not lead to the most 
successful outcome of the program.34  This is a fundamental benefit of 
using additionality as a criterion for program participation.  It allows 
the program’s money to be spent on real reductions, rather than using 
limited resources to fund what would have happened regardless. 
C. Investor Confidence 
Additionality is also important to give market investors 
confidence in the system.  Unless someone buying into the system 
knows that their money may be used to pay those already providing 
ecosystem services, most people assume additionality in the market 
and expect that their funding will alter “business as usual” in some 
way.  If investors find out that many projects funded through a PES 
program are non-additional, the program may lose many investors. 
III. CURRENT PES SYSTEM MODELS FOR ADDRESSING 
ADDITIONALITY 
As already stated, most PES programs do not currently require 
that projects be additional to qualify for participation, partially out of 
fear that assessing additionality will prove to be cost-prohibitive.35  
Additionality standards can be viewed as an impediment to quick, 
universal adoption and participation in PES systems.36  As experience 
in carbon markets has demonstrated, developing and implementing 
additionality criteria is complicated, since predicting what would have 
happened in the future is not simple.  This can also be a political 
challenge, since implementing any new participation criteria excludes 
some people from the PES program. 
In order to help those considering implementing an additionality 
standard and allay fears as to its complexity and cost, this section lays 
out four options that different PES systems are using to ensure that 
services receiving payments are additional.  After laying out the basic 
method for each approach, the benefits and downsides of each model 
are considered.  Where possible, approaches for strengthening each 
 
Wunder, Payments for Environmental Services and the Poor: Concepts and Preliminary 
Evidence, 13 ENV’T. & DEV. ECON. 279 (2008). 
 34. Pagiola, supra note 3, at 717. 
 35. Sommerville et al., supra note 11, at 40. 
 36. See Wunder et al., supra note 16, at 845; see also Ferraro & Pattanayak, supra note 15, 
at 486. 
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option are also presented, including possibilities for combining 
models.  The approaches presented here are not exhaustive.  They are 
simply illustrative of what is currently being employed with at least 
some success. 
Additionality assessments in carbon markets typically take the 
form of project-by-project assessments or standardized tests.37  These 
two models are laid out first.  The third model explored, discounting, 
bases crediting levels on the likelihood that an activity is additional.  
The fourth, probability assessments, builds on a PES system in 
Mexico.  The final subsection discusses how to update and correct 
additionality assessments once they are in place. 
A. Project-specific Assessment 
Project-by-project assessments are the most intuitive model of 
additionality assessment.  Here, a project developer submits a 
proposal to a regulating entity, which reviews and evaluates whether 
the project is additional.  Generally programs have established 
guidelines for evaluating the projects, but ultimately, the decision 
rests on a subjective evaluation of the application. 
The world’s largest PES system, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism,38 employs this approach.  Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, industrialized nations are able to fund projects to lower 
greenhouse gas emissions in developing economies.39  A CDM project 
must result in a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions “that is 
additional to any that would otherwise occur,” meaning emissions 
“are reduced below those that would have occurred in the absence of 
the registered CDM project.”40  The CDM project approval process is 
 
 37. Broekhoff, supra note 19, at 3. 
 38. Some have noted the uniqueness of CDM; it is the only major offset market designed 
to work in multiple countries for nearly any industry.  Because of this need for broad 
applicability with limited resources, CDM may be a unique case requiring at least some project-
specific evaluation and bottom-up development of assessment processes.  Id. at 32. 
 39. UNFCCC, supra note 4, at 23. 
 40. Id. at 14, 16.  Note that this is the political definition documented in the UNFCCC 
treaty.  In reality, the definition is circular and problematic. “[I]n the absence of the registered 
CDM project” logically requires that in the counterfactual scenario the project would not have 
occurred without CDM.  In practice, the tests implemented by the CDM Board look beyond 
this political definition and determine whether, in fact, the project would have been 
implemented in the absence of CDM funding. 
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governed by an executive board, which in turn uses independent 
verifying agencies to review proposals.41 
The executive board examines a baseline, specific to each 
project, that represents what would have happened in the absence of 
the CDM program.42  The project must show that there is an 
alternative for the land that is more likely to have occurred had CDM 
not existed.43  Developers also must show either that there is a lack of 
financing for the project or that the activity proposed faces a 
significant barrier to implementation without CDM.44  Finally, 
projects cannot be common practice.45  For CDM, no project can be 
classified as additional solely by meeting certain objective criteria (as 
opposed to the standardized approach presented in the following 
section).46  Other programs use project-specific approaches as well.  
California’s Climate Action Reserve (“CAR”), for example, looks to 
see whether there is an imminent and known threat of forestland 
conversion.47  If a project developer can show through contracts or 
financial offers that there is a threat of land conversion within five 
years, that plot is eligible for avoided conversion credits under the 
program.48 
In theory, project-specific assessments should be the most 
accurate determinate of additionality.  This approach is flexible, since 
regulating entities can use discretion in granting project credits.49  
Also, a project-specific approach looks more directly at individual 
intent, unlike standardization, which may judge the additionality of 
one person’s action based on the rest of the surrounding community 
(see, for example, the common practice criteria in the following 
section).50 
 
 41. See Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon 
Offsets 14 (Stanford Univ. Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74, 
2008). 
 42. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Tool for the Demonstration and 
Assessment of Additionality, Version 05.2, at 4, available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/ 
PAmethodologies/tools/am-tool-01-v5.2.pdf. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 59. 
 45. Id. at 10. 
 46. Broekhoff, supra note 19, at 35. 
 47. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY FOREST CERTIFICATION PROTOCOL: ENTITIES & 
PROJECTS: VERSION 2.0 § IV.2.5.B.3 (2007) [hereinafter CAR]. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Broekhoff, supra note 19, at 6 (reviewing the pros and cons of a project-specific 
method). 
 50. See id. 
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Due to its nature, however, a project-specific approach is time 
consuming and costly.  Project-specific analysis is complicated, and 
anyone’s ability to subjectively determine individual intent is often 
questioned.  An investor’s decision to pursue a project is a complex 
balance of options, risks, and barriers.51  Project-by-project 
certification is often a cumbersome and slow process given its 
complexity—a 2008 study reported that CDM credits are being issued 
at a rate that is only 2.5 to 5 percent of what is needed.52  The 
complexity can also lead to high administrative costs.  If there is 
significant financial burden placed on project developers, there is a 
worry that projects will become unviable on the market.53  Some have 
suggested that project approval depends more on the “packaging” of 
information than on the data actually provided.54 A 2007 study of a 
sample of Indian CDM projects found that many of the projects had 
not provided information required for additionality analysis.55  Where 
information was provided, it often lacked detail and was 
unsubstantiated. 
There is also a question of whether project-specific approaches 
may “fail to see the forest for the trees.”  Wara and Victor56 recount 
an example of a series of Chinese hydropower, wind, and natural gas 
plants that have applied for CDM credits on an individual basis.  The 
Chinese government has a national policy to move toward these 
renewable energy sources and away from coal due to environmental 
health concerns and the national coal supply’s inability to keep up 
 
 51. See LAMBERT SCHNEIDER, IS THE CDM FULFILLING ITS ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES? AN EVALUATION OF THE CDM AND OPTIONS 
FOR IMPROVEMENT 40 (2007). 
 52. Wara & Victor, supra note 41, at 5. 
 53. See id. at 14 (stating that extensive investigation of CDM project proposals would price 
out small projects because of cost and uncertainty). 
 54. AXEL MICHAELOWA & PALLEV PUROHIT, ADDITIONALITY DETERMINATION OF 
INDIAN CDM PROJECTS: CAN INDIAN CDM PROJECT DEVELOPERS OUTWIT THE CDM 
EXECUTIVE BOARD? 13 (2007); see also Schneider, supra note 51, at 29. 
 55. Michaelowa & Purohit, supra note 54. 
 56. Wara and Victor’s analysis may not actually signify a problem with the CDM.  The 
study focuses on projects that have been submitted, not necessarily those that have been 
registered and given credit.  The CDM Executive Board may take this type of problem into 
account. Recent news articles, in fact, report that the CDM Executive Board has been taking a 
hard line against Chinese renewable projects. Bruce Einhorn, UN and China Squabble over 
Wind Subsidies, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/ 
blog/eyeonasia/archives/2009/12/un_and_china_sq.html. Regardless of the practical outcome of 
this particular example, however, the overarching point is still important, and additionality 
systems need to account for it in their screening analysis. 
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with demand.57  Each renewable energy plant seems additional 
standing alone; they typically cost more than a new coal fired plant.58  
But if CDM were to approve all of these plants, they would ignore the 
drive toward hydro, wind, and natural gas that would have happened 
regardless due to China’s national policy.59  This type of problem may 
be avoided under a standardized approach. 
B. Standardized Additionality Assessments 
In recognition of the challenges presented by a project-specific 
approach, many carbon markets are moving toward standardized 
criteria in their additionality assessments.60  Standardized approaches 
use general criteria to assess whether a particular project is likely to 
be additional.61  Therefore, standardization works best when there are 
clear distinguishing features between “business-as-usual” behavior 
and “additional” activities, and those features can be transformed 
into objective criteria.62  These general criteria are built around 
observations of what characteristics additional projects typically have.  
These characteristics are then turned into objective, predefined 
criteria to sort projects into those likely to be additional and those 
that likely will not be additional.63  Projects that match the criteria 
typical of activities that are additional are eligible to participate in the 
PES program. 
Types of criteria used by existing carbon and ecosystem service 
markets are varied.  They include: 
 Legal/regulatory: exclude projects that are required by 
law.64  Many carbon markets, such as the Regional 
 
 57. Wara & Victor, supra note 41, at 13. 
 58. Id. at 14. 
 59. Id. at 13. 
 60. See, e.g., Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord [MGGRA], Advisory Group 
Draft Final Recommendations § 4.2.2 (2009); RGGI, supra note 10, at § 10.1; W. Climate 
Initiative, Design Recommendations for the WCI Regional Cap-and-Trade Program § 9.5 (2009); 
American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 1396 (2009). 
 61. BROEKHOFF, supra note 19, at 6. 
 62. One study of carbon markets found that those systems crediting natural carbon 
sequestration were harder to standardize as compared to other technological options, such as 
those for the energy, industry, building, and waste management sectors.  Id. at 20–22.  This 
brings into question how useful standardization can be for many PES systems that do not 
revolve around technological options. 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. This simple proclamation may require refinement when implemented in real policy. 
Systems will need to clarify what it means to be required by law. BROEKHOFF, supra note 19, at 
26.  Additionally, systems will need to decide how to handle laws that regularly are not enforced 
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Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),65 the Midwestern 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (“MGGRA”),66 and 
CAR,67 only credit projects that are implementing 
practices not legally mandated. 
 Date: exclude projects initiated before a set date.  The 
United States Government’s Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program (“EQIP”), for example, will only 
fund practices not previously adopted by the landowner 
applying for funds.68  The related Conservation Reserve 
Program (“CRP”), which provides farmers payments for 
retiring farmland into non-crop use, requires that people 
applying for funding show that their farmland produced 
crops four out of six years prior to the program’s start 
date.69  This criterion should not be used in isolation to 
determine additionality, but can be an easy70 way to 
exclude some business-as-usual projects.71 
 Performance standard: require projects to achieve 
pollutant or emissions levels better than a previously 
defined benchmark.72 
 Financial: look for evidence that the project could not be 
implemented without the PES funding.73  Some systems 
 
and therefore are often not followed.  Federal law in Brazil, for example, requires landowners to 
maintain 80% of the natural vegetation on their property.  BRASIL C. FLOR. COMENTADO, Lei 
No. 4,771 (Sept. 15, 1965).  Historically, the law has not been enforced, though efforts have been 
increasing over the past few years. 
 65. RGGI, supra note 10, at § 10.3.d.1. 
 66. MGGRA, supra note 60, at § 4.2.2. 
 67. CAR, supra note 47, at § IV.2.5.B.1. 
 68. Environmental Quality Incentives Program, 7 C.F.R. § 1466.10(b) (2009). 
 69. USDA FSA, supra note 6. 
 70. The ease with which this criterion can be assessed is of course circumstantial. With 
some management practices, such as conservation tillage, it can be much more challenging to 
establish whether or not the activity was occurring before the PES program was put into place.  
See Roger Claassen, Andrea Cattaneo & Robert Johansson, Cost-effective Design of Agri-
environmental Payment Programs: U.S. Experience in Theory and Practice, 65 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON., 737, 749 (2003). 
 71. See BROEKHOFF, supra note 19, at 26. 
 72. How to determine a standardized baseline is beyond the scope of this paper.  For 
nearly any additionality system, however, having a baseline is crucial to monitoring the 
program’s effectiveness.  By definition, monitoring additionality entails having an established 
and credible baseline since additionality is changing “business-as-usual” behavior to achieve the 
best environmental outcomes possible.  For more on developing baselines, see BROEKHOFF, 
supra note 19. 
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exclude projects that are already receiving public funding 
to support their development.74  RGGI, for instance, 
excludes projects collecting some public subsidies.75  The 
Great Miami River Watershed Water-Quality Credit 
Trading program will not approve projects already 
funded through Farm Bill conservation programs or 
Clean Water Act funding provided by the state.76 
 Common practice: show that the proposed activity is 
uncommon.  The American Carbon Registry (“ACR”), 
for example, does not credit projects that are prevalent in 
the project’s region.77 
 Technology: 78 develop a list of new technologies, 
potentially using a “best available technology” standard, 
which are not business-as-usual.79  RGGI assesses the 
qualification of some projects based on the market 
penetration of the technology being implemented.  For 
example, projects lowering carbon dioxide emissions 
from natural gas must use technologies with a market 
penetration rate of less than 5 percent.80 
 Size: disallow projects that are either below or above a 
certain size.  This approach is useful where business-as-
 
 73. An alternative to this approach, which may be easier to implement, but is likely less 
stringent, is to develop a list of “least-cost options” for various industries and land. If the project 
does not match what is on the list, then it passes this financial threshold.  Id. at 26. 
 74. Whether this type of criteria is appropriate or not is currently up for debate. Many 
projects currently eligible for some funding under PES systems are interested in receiving 
additional money for other ecosystem services generated by their activities that are not 
currently being “sold”. This issue of “stacking” is explored more in several recent articles.  See 
WORLD RESOURCES INST., STACKING PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 2 (2009). 
 75. RGGI, supra note 10, at § 10.3.d.3. 
 76. See Steven Zwick, Ohio Water Trading: Driving Without Drivers, ECOSYSTEM 
MARKETPLACE, June 10, 2008, http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/ 
article.page.php?page_id=5915&section=home. 
 77. Am. Carbon Registry, Technical Standard Version 1.0, at 9 (2009), available at http:// 
www.americancarbonregistry.org/carbon-
accounting/ACR%20Technical%20Standard%202009%20v1.0.pdf. 
 78. This approach could also work for certain types of land uses. Some have argued, for 
example, that forestland without any harvesting is almost always a low-value use of a piece of 
land. Therefore, under some systems, it may make sense to automatically allow afforestation 
projects. 
 79. BROEKHOFF, supra note 19, at 26. 
 80. RGGI, supra note 10, at § 10.5.d.1.ii.c. 
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usual projects are usually beyond or beneath a distinct 
size threshold.81 
These categories display the full range of standardization criteria 
currently used in carbon markets.  Some of these criteria types are 
more applicable to PES while others have fairly limited potential.  
Performance standards, for example, as currently used are only 
relevant for markets that monitor a pollutant emission rate.  This 
criterion is likely to be helpful in a water quality market, but may not 
apply to other PES programs that do not involve pollutant baselines, 
such as wetland mitigation banking.  Common practice or date 
criteria, on the other hand, will likely pertain to most PES systems. 
It is important to note that, in most cases, using just one of these 
factors will not go very far in addressing additionality.  For example, 
the CRP additionality criteria noted above, under “date”, is the only 
additionality criteria the program considers.82  Proving what has 
happened in the past does not show what would have occurred in the 
future.  This shows in the program’s estimated additionality rates.  
One study estimates that only 10 percent of the land enrolled in CRP 
in 1997 would have shifted to non-crop use without any CRP 
payments.83  Another study estimated that only 51 percent of lands 
renewing in the CRP program are additional.84  CRP may have 
achieved a better additionality rate if it had implemented further 
standardized criteria screens. 
As noted earlier, most programs that address additionality use a 
system at least partially comprised of standardized criteria.85  
Standardization can lower administrative and transaction costs of a 
program.  Though it can be resource and time intensive to set up 
initially, standardization decreases administrative challenges for 
implementation.  Developers and investors in PES projects tend to 
prefer standardization as well because the system is transparent and 
certain.86  Unlike a project-specific evaluation, project developers 
know under a standardized system that if their project meets certain 
 
 81. BROEKHOFF, supra note 19, at 26. 
 82. USDA FSA, supra note 6. 
 83. Lubowski et al., supra note 17, at 23. 
 84. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 48. 
 85. See RGGI, supra note 10, at § 10.1; see also MGGRA, supra note 60, at § 4.2.2; W. 
Climate Initiative, supra note 60, at § 9.5; American Clean Energy and Security Act, supra note 
60, at § 1396. 
 86. MICHAEL LAZARUS ET AL., EVALUATION OF BENCHMARKING AS AN APPROACH FOR 
ESTABLISHING CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM BASELINES ii (1999). 
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predefined criteria, it will be approved.  That said, a standardized 
system might credit projects that are not additional and exclude 
projects that are. 
C. Discounting or Trading Ratios 
There is inherent uncertainty in any prediction of what would 
have happened in the absence of a PES.  Sometimes in an 
acknowledgment of uncertainty, regulating agencies will implement 
trading ratios to discount the amount of ecosystem services 
landholders are credited with providing.87  In the face of uncertainty, 
trading ratios enable programs to use conservative estimates of the 
ecosystem services provided by the program, thereby securing 
environmental and market integrity.88 
Many water quality trading programs use trading ratios to offset 
uncertainty89 in the nutrient reductions achieved through best 
management practices.90  Virginia’s water quality program establishes 
a market for nitrogen and phosphorous that allows wastewater 
treatment plants to offset their nutrient effluents by purchasing 
credits from reductions made by farmers.  Offsets from farms are 
discounted 2:1.91  Therefore, for every 100 units of nitrogen that a 
wastewater treatment plant emits, they would need to purchase 
credits to cover 200 units from a farmer.  A 2009 survey of existing 
water quality trading programs found that while several utilized 
trading ratios to protect against uncertainty, none of those ratios were 
based on scientific or statistical analysis.92  The ratios instead were set 
 
 87. See LYDIA OLANDER, DESIGNING OFFSETS POLICY FOR THE U.S.: PRINCIPLES, 
CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR ENCOURAGING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS AND SEQUESTRATION FROM UNCAPPED ENTITIES AS PART OF A FEDERAL CAP-
AND-TRADE FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 40 (2008). 
 88. Id. 
 89. In water quality trading markets, this type of discounting is often known as an 
“uncertainty ratio.”  Water quality markets also use discounting to serve other purposes, such as 
the “delivery ratio,” which adjusts credit amounts for the attenuation of the nutrient load 
between the site of crediting and the water body whose nutrient levels are being regulated.  
SELMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 10–11. 
 90. See, e.g., Suzie Greenhalgh & Paul Faeth, Trading on Water, 16 FORUM FOR APPLIED 
RESEARCH AND PUB. POL’Y 71, 74 (2001) (discussing trading in the context of nutrient 
impairment); NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 15. 
 91. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, TRADING NUTRIENT REDUCTIONS FROM NONPOINT 
SOURCE BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED: GUIDANCE 
FOR AGRICULTURAL LANDOWNERS AND YOUR POTENTIAL TRADING PARTNERS 7 (2008), 
available at http://www.deq.virginia.gov/export/sites/default/vpdes/pdf/VANPSTradingManual 
_2-5-08.pdf. 
 92. SELMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 10. 
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at levels thought to be sufficiently conservative, yet still politically 
viable.93 
Instead of discounting on the basis of uncertainty analysis, credits 
can be granted based on the degree to which the technology or 
activity utilized by the project has penetrated the market.94  For 
example, if 10 percent of farmers in a given area use riparian buffers, 
then a project proposing to implement riparian buffers would be 
considered 90 percent additional and would receive 90 percent of the 
credits for the project.  This approach would provide a dynamic 
reflection of the market, so that as practices become more common, 
their additionality and therefore potential to receive credits would 
decrease.  This approach provides payment to “early actors”, but may 
be harder to apply in PES systems that pay for conservation, as 
opposed to the implementation of new activities. 
There are several problems with discount rates.  Primarily, if the 
discount rates are too extreme, costs may be too high to allow 
sufficient participation in the PES system.95  Discounting rates are 
also somewhat unfair to projects that are additional.  Projects that do 
maintain environmental and market integrity are required by the 
system to carry the financial burden of the system’s inability to screen 
out non-additional projects.96  To the extent that discounting allows 
participation by “early actors,” however, it promotes fairness by 
providing payment to those who were already acting in an 
environmentally responsible way. 
A system may be able to lower its discounting rate by applying 
some standardized criteria before assessing the appropriate discount 
rate.  Programs could apply basic criteria, such as excluding projects 
that are legally required or started before the program date, and then 
discount the remaining projects at a less extreme rate to account for 
the additional uncertainty.  Setting discount rates involves balancing 
the precautionary principle97 with the need of the system to provide 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. ZACH WILLEY & BILL CHAMEIDES, HARNESSING FARMS AND FORESTS IN THE LOW-
CARBON ECONOMY: HOW TO CREATE, MEASURE, AND VERIFY GREENHOUSE GAS OFFSETS 
46-47 (2007). 
 95. OLANDER, supra note 87, at 40. 
 96. Id. 
 97. The precautionary principle holds that when there is a dearth of scientific proof, people 
should protect against environmental degradation if there is a threat of significant or 
irreversible natural damage. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) 
(Aug. 12, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
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adequate payment to incentivize landholders to alter their behavior.  
Discounting makes the most sense for programs that trade offsets 
under a regulatory cap, such as water quality markets, or to evaluate 
the comparative value of different projects.  This approach is 
probably not appropriate for PES programs that promote an overall 
environmental goal, such as the program in Costa Rica or New York’s 
Catskill watershed. 
D. Probability Assessment 
Mexico has implemented a payment for hydrological 
environmental services (pago de servicios ambientales hidrológicos, 
or “PSAH”) program with an econometric system to assess the 
deforestation risk of lands applying for program participation.98  The 
PSAH has just begun to use the model to prioritize applicants for 
participation,99 but this approach could be a promising option moving 
forward to ensure project additionality. 
The PSAH has allocated a limited pot of money to pay 
landholders to preserve their forests in order to secure hydrological 
ecosystem services from the land.100  Since it is important to the 
program to obtain the maximum level of conservation possible for the 
funding available, researchers from the Instituto Nacional de 
Ecología (“INE”) have developed an econometric model of 
deforestation as an indicator of opportunity cost and risk of 
deforestation on each plot of land.101  The INE compared satellite 
images from 2000 with images from 1994 to discover which lands in 
Mexico were deforested in that timeframe.102  INE then analyzed 
patterns of deforestation to assess the relative contribution of a 
variety of factors, including slope, altitude, distance to population 
centers, potential agricultural yields, poverty, forest type, and natural 
protected areas.103  For example, the potential agricultural yield 
calculates the potential value of land left as forest as compared to the 
value of the land if converted to agriculture; this value is translated 
into corresponding deforestation risk.104  Based on this data, INE has 
 
 98. Carlos Muñoz-Piña et al., Paying for the Hydrological Services of Mexico’s Forests: 
Analysis, Negotiations and Results, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 725, 731 (2008). 
 99. Id. at 732. 
 100. Id. at 725. 
 101. Id. at 729. 
 102. Id. at 731. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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created a map of deforestation risk and sorted forest areas 
accordingly.105 
The agency administering PSAH adopted the model along with 
factoring in hydrological and social importance of the plot in its 2006 
rules to prioritize program applicants.106  As such, PSAH is not 
currently using additionality per se as qualification criteria for 
program participation.  They are instead using their model of 
deforestation risk to prioritize applications based on likelihood that 
their project is additional. 
In order for Mexico’s econometric approach to be transformed 
into a true additionality test, the program would have to set a cut-off 
limit.  For example, the program could only allow participants whose 
land had at least an 80 percent chance of deforestation.  This could 
further be combined with a discounting system, as explained in the 
previous section.  The rules of the program could predefine a cut-off 
limit (as a standardized performance baseline); those projects which 
had, for example, an 80 percent or higher risk would receive 
payments, but only at a 80 percent crediting rate. 
For many PES systems, particularly those involving conservation 
rather than changing land-use or management in some way, risk 
analysis is a realistic approach to addressing additionality.  This 
method may also be helpful for climate offsets, particularly those 
related to land management.  Mexico’s PSAH econometric model is 
promising because it allows policymakers to implement a dynamic 
additionality system.  Regulating agencies can observe what happens 
on the land screened out of the program as too low risk to qualify as 
additional.  If real world results do not match what was predicted in 
the model, the model can be adjusted for future PES determinations. 
What happens on the land not included in the system may still be 
affected by the program, though.  There is a large risk in this system 
that leakage107 will subvert the gains thought to have been achieved.  
If a program conserves high-risk land, as this system could, pressure 
to deforest may simply move to other land.  In order to be certain 
that leakage will not happen, a program would need to have 100 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 732. 
 107. Leakage refers to an increase in a particular activity in one region as a result of 
reductions in that activity made in another region pursuant to an environmental goal.  In 
climate, for example, reducing deforestation in one country to sequester higher levels of carbon 
dioxide could lead to increased deforestation in another country to fill international demand for 
timber. 
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percent participation.  Shy of that, separate methodologies can be 
developed to assess leakage and account for it in additionality 
systems.108 
The econometric model utilized in Mexico would also be a more 
sophisticated way to determine the uncertainty trading ratios that are 
currently utilized by water quality markets.109  Instead of setting a 
discount rate based on balancing political needs with generally 
perceived uncertainty risk, PES systems could actually quantify 
specific rates at a project level using the econometric model 
developed by INE. 
One challenge to implementing this sort of system is that it 
requires significant upfront data collection and analysis.  For those 
thinking about implementing a program similar to Mexico’s, it is 
important to note that the development of PSAH’s econometric 
model was eased by using data already collected by the government.110  
For example, to add data on potential agricultural yields, INE used 
data that was already being collected by the National Statistics 
Institute.111  Using preexisting data where possible will lower the time 
and resource cost of developing a model. 
E. A Learning Approach to Additionality 
While experience in analyzing additionality is growing, there is 
still a fair amount to learn to ensure that a PES system is paying only 
for ecosystem services which would not be provided but for the 
program’s incentives.  Once an initial approach to additionality 
 
 108. See, e.g., Louise Aukland, Pedro Moura Costa & Sandra Brown, A Conceptual 
Framework and its Application for Addressing Leakage on Avoided Deforestation Projects, 3 
CLIMATE POL’Y 123, 129–33 (2003) (presenting a step-by-step approach to identify and assess 
leakage generated by a project). 
 109. Academic studies have been conducted on how to build uncertainty analysis into water 
quality trading ratios.  See, e.g., Arun S. Malik, David Letson & Stephen R. Crutchfield, 
Point/Nonpoint Source Trading of Pollution Abatement: Choosing the Right Trading Ratio, 75 
AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 959 (1993) (quantifying the uncertainty in water quality trading of 
stochastic nonpoint loadings and of the effectiveness of management plans); H.X. Zhang, 
Linking Trading Ratio with TMDL (Total Maximum Daily Load) Allocation Matrix and 
Uncertainty Analysis, 58 WATER SCI. & TECH. 103 (2008) (calculating water quality trading 
ratios based on an uncertainty analysis of results from best management practices and of source 
distance to the water body). 
 110. Muñoz-Piña et al., supra note 99, at 731; Christian Layke, Measuring Nature’s Benefits: 
A Preliminary Roadmap for Improving Ecosystem Service Indicators, 4 (World Research 
Institute Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.wri.org/publication/measuring-natures-
benefits. 
 111. Muñoz-Piña et al., supra note 99, at 731. 
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analysis is established, project approval and crediting can commence, 
but it is important to monitor the program to determine how 
successful the process is at determining project additionality.  The 
system will need to be adjusted over time based on lessons learned.  
For example, if a standardized approach is authorizing projects that 
are not additional and excluding some projects that are additional, 
the criteria may need to be adjusted to balance the overall 
additionality of the program or a discounting approach may need to 
be layered onto the standardization process.  No set of additionality 
tests can ever be perfect; additionality screens will have to be 
continuously adjusted to balance the complex objectives of any 
program.112 
One approach to monitoring the success of an approach to 
additionality determination is to track a control group of projects not 
included in the PES.  This ex post analysis has been used in the 
regional integrated silvopastoral ecosystem management project of 
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua.113  There, the regulating agency 
monitors land-use changes by a group of non-participants along with 
watching PES recipients.114  By monitoring the additionality of 
different types of technology or land-use behavior in a particular 
region, a program can check its assumptions about the likelihood of 
additionality.  In implementing this approach, programs need to be 
careful about the control group used—there may be problems with 
leakage, as mentioned in the previous section.  Additionally, some 
have questioned whether individuals who participate in PES are 
really analogous to those who do not.  Participants may be more 
likely to have an environmental interest,115 thereby making these 
landholders more likely to pursue environmental goals even without 
PES.116  In a program where there is greater participation demand 
 
 112. See Mark C. Trexler, Derik L. Broekhoff & Laura H. Kosloff, A Statistically-Driven 
Approach to Offset-Based GHG Additionality Determinations: What Can We Learn?, 6 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. LAW & POL’Y 30 (2006) (addressing how a statistical assessment of false 
positives and false negatives of additionality in existing systems can be used to ensure 
environmental integrity in offset systems). 
 113. Stefano Pagiola et al., Paying for Biodiversity Conservation Services in Agricultural 
Landscapes, at 1, (World Bank Env’t Dep’t Papers No. 96, 2004). 
 114. Id.; see also Wunder et al., supra note 16, at 845. 
 115. A study in Costa Rica found that landholders with a personal conviction to protect the 
environment were more likely to participate in Costa Rica’s laws surrounding Protected Areas. 
Jeffrey A. Langholz et al., Economic Considerations of Privately-Owned Parks, 33 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 173, 180–181 (2000). 
 116. Ferraro & Pattanayak, supra note 15, at 485; see also Katherine Smith & Marca 
Weinberg, Measuring the Success of Conservation Programs, 2 AMBER WAVES 14, 16 (2004). 
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from ecosystem service providers than funds available, the program 
could monitor projects that were not accepted into the program, even 
though their project qualified.  This should allow for a control group 
comparable to those participating. 
CONCLUSION 
Additionality is essential in promoting the environmental and 
market integrity, as well as the economic efficiency, of PES programs.  
Choosing an approach to assess additionality is a decision that 
inevitably involves a balancing of economic costs, social equity, 
environmental integrity, and political realities.  Additionality 
assessments never operate perfectly.  It will inevitably be a policy 
decision as to whether a strict limit makes sense, with emphasis on 
excluding non-additional projects, or whether to implement a process 
that is more lenient,117 which could encourage incentives and 
opportunities.  Transparency and stakeholder engagement in this 
decision process will be absolutely essential to developing a successful 
methodology.  Each of the four systems presented here is a promising 
approach to additionality assessment, and yet each comes with a set 
of problems.  Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each system 
and considering how they can be used in combination will allow 
continued improvement in ensuring additionality in all environmental 
markets. 
 
 
 
 117. There are also policy options to account for non-additional projects mixing into the 
system, such as discounting.  Another possibility is adding a buffer in the cap to deal with the 
imperfections. 
